This paper models perfectionism in Gul and Pesendorfer's (2001) framework where spontaneous temptations can lead people to deviate from their long-term normative ideals. My model can accommodate some puzzling empirical patterns in preferences for flexibility and commitment. First, striving for normative ideals can motivate excess preference for flexibility. For instance, health-club members who pursue unattainable fitness objectives may 'pay not to go the gym' as in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) . Similarly, perfectionists may routinely succumb to temptations that can be avoided through previous commitments, such as the self-imposed deadlines in Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) .
Introduction
Both flexibility and commitment can be valuable in intertemporal decision problems. The former can be desirable for agents who are uncertain about their future tastes (as in Kreps [28] ), while the latter can help to avoid anticipated preference reversals (as in Strotz [44] ) and costly self-control (as in Gul and Pesendorfer [19] , henceforth GP).
Yet these standard choice-theoretic models do not fit some empirical patterns in preferences for flexibility and commitment. For example, DellaVigna and Malmendier [11] (henceforth DVM) observe that an average member of a health club in their dataset could save more than $300 a year by switching from monthly or annual fees to per-visit passes. This observation suggests that many people can pay a substantial price for flexibility that they do not use afterwards. Another sign of excess preference for flexibility is that American households waste more $40 billion worth of food annually, which exceeds 15% of their food purchases.
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There is also evidence that people may persistently succumb to temptations that can be avoided through previous commitment. For example,
• students procrastinate after imposing too lenient deadlines on submitting their assignments (Ariely and Wertenbroch [3] );
• consumers overspend when paying with credit cards rather than cash (see Feinberg [14] and Prelec and Simister [34] ). Yet more than 180 million Americans still use credit cards regularly with an average of 3.5 open accounts, $4500 of revolving debt, and $1500 of monthly charges per cardholder. 2 This data suggests that many people could get a normatively better consumption by committing to use credit cards less frequently, say by opening fewer accounts or by leaving their cards at home, especially in the absence of liquidity constraints.
The leading explanation for such puzzling behaviors is that people can be naive about their future preferences and self-control. Models of partial naivete have been used to explain procrastination (O'Donoghue and Rabin [32] ), health-club membership decisions (DVM), exploitation in credit markets (Heidhues and Kőszegi [22] ) and other behavioral puzzles. Yet it is not clear from these models why people should be unable or unwilling to form realistic expectations of their repetitive choices like exercise, food consumption, or credit card use.
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In this paper, I argue that perfectionism can motivate the above puzzling behavioral patterns even when agents have accurate beliefs about their own behavior. Psychological literature (e.g. Stoeber and Otto [41] ) provides some evidence that perfectionist strivings to attain normative ideals can help people increase their subjective well-being and positive affect even when these ideals are rejected in the presence of temptations. As stated by Lundh [30, p.256] : "There need be nothing negative or dysfunctional about the striving for perfection-on the contrary, such strivings represent an important part of healthy human functioning. . . "
To formalize this intuition, I adopt GP's two-period decision framework, where preferences are defined over menus-sets of consumption lotteries. Each menu A is interpreted as a physical action that, if chosen ex ante, makes the set A feasible ex post. Because of ex post temptations, the decision maker may deviate from her long-term normative objectives. Yet she may still strive ex ante to keep the normatively superior alternatives feasible. For example, she may choose a menu {x, y} over {y} even if she persistently rejects the normatively better alternative x in favor of the temptation y ex post. By keeping x feasible, she can satisfy her ex ante perfectionist strivings and comply temporarily with her fitness goals, financial objectives, New Year resolutions, moral values etc.
Besides striving for flawlessness, perfectionism has been associated with overly critical self-evaluation and various negative emotions-such as guilt, shame, anger, or embarrassment (Flett and Hewitt [16] , Stoeber et al. [40] ). In GP's framework, anticipation of negative ex post self-evaluation can motivate the decision maker to self-handicap, that is, to remove superior normative alternatives from the feasible menu. For example, she may have the ranking {x} ≻ {y} ≻ {x, y},
where x is staying late at work and y is a more tempting alternative with less normative value, such as going out with friends. This ranking is plausible if the decision maker anticipates that she will succumb to the temptation y in the menu {x, y}, but suffer from negative self-evaluative emotions afterwards. Indeed, there is some empirical evidence (Morris [31] , Tice, Bratslavsky, and Baumeister [47] ) that negative emotional affect and ruminative thoughts reduce people's satisfaction with regular activities, such as socializing with friends. A fear of negative self-evaluation can also motivate avoidant procrastination where people put off starting things for fear of doing less than perfect job. In words of Van Eerde [48] , "procrastination is helpful to create the idea that one would have done better, if only one had started earlier." To accommodate perfectionist behaviors, I propose a utility representation
where κ > −1, and u and v are expected utility functions over consumption lotteries. This representation includes GP's model as a special case with κ = 0 and suggests similar interpretations for the functions u and v. The commitment utility u represents the ranking of singleton menus that is identified with the decision maker's long-term normative preference. The temptation utility v determines the negative component max y∈A (v(y) − v(x)), which reflects the anticipated cost of ex post self-control. More generally, the interpretation of the functional form (2) in my model depends on the sign of the parameter κ. If κ > 0, then the component κ max z∈A u(z) in representation (2) can be interpreted as a utility derived from perfectionist strivings rather than from anticipated consumption.
If −1 < κ < 0, then representation (2) is equivalent to
.
The decision maker as portrayed by this utility function expects that both selfcontrol and self-evaluation will be mentally costly ex post. The two anticipated costs are proportional to the losses in temptation and commitment utilities that are produced by the ex post choice x in the menu A. My main result (Theorem 2.1 below) axiomatizes representation (2) in terms of preference ≽. To do so, I adapt standard conditions of Order, Continuity, and Independence, and then relax GP's Set-Betweenness by restricting it to choices between menus that share the same best normative element z. It is assumed that perfectionism should not affect choice among such menus. Formally, I require that
whenever z ∈ A ∩ B is such that {z} ≽ {x} for all x ∈ A ∪ B. As in GP, the normative preference is identified with the commitment ranking of singleton menus.
My second result (Theorem 2.2) establishes that under a mild regularity condition, the parameter κ in representation (2) is unique, and the pair of functions u and v is unique up to a positive linear transformation. Theorem 2.3 shows how changes in the magnitude of the parameter κ can be revealed via simple comparative conditions on choice behavior.
The decision maker as portrayed by (2) should plan her ex post choice x A in any menu A to strike an optimal compromise between her normative utility and the emotional effects of self-control and perfectionism. This compromise is obtained by maximizing the function u+v. Theorem 2.4 shows that u+v represents the unique ex post choice rule that satisfies weak axiom of revealed preference, continuity, and a suitable consistency condition with the ex ante preference.
Related Literature
To explain procrastination, O'Donoghue and Rabin [32] , propose a model of time inconsistency with partial naivete, where agents have (β, δ) preferences with quasihyperbolic discounting and overestimate their future self-control parameter β to bê β ∈ (β, 1]. DVM use the same model as a leading explanation for their paradoxical observations.
Partially naive agents may have inaccurate ex ante expectations about their ex post choices and temptations, which can be revealed through their preference over menus. To illustrate, consider that 25% of Americans who pay marathon fees (up to $180) choose not to run later. (See Wall Street Journal [23] .) People who pay the registration fee exhibit the preference {z, y} ≻ {x} ≻ {y}, where z is official participation in the marathon, y is paying the fee and not showing up, and x is abstaining from registration. Both perfectionist strivings and partial naivete can explain this preference together with the ex post choice of y in the menu {z, y}. Yet the two explanations have different implications for preference for commitment. A perfectionist absentee must have the ranking {z} ≻ {z, y} because she correctly anticipates her choice in {z, y} to be y. For instance, she can actively seek a companion for the marathon or hire a coach in order to commit to z. By contrast, a partially naive agent would desire no commitment and have the ranking {z} ∼ {z, y} because she does not expect to be tempted to choose y rather than z. Yet her expectations are wrong, and she succumbs to the unexpected temptation not to run. Heidhues and Koszegi [21] make a similar observation in a two-period framework with partial naivete.
Next, representation (2) is a special case of temptation-driven preferences studied by Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [10] (henceforth, DLR). Their model suggests a different interpretation for the functional form (2) in terms of random and cumulative temptations for κ > 0 and κ < 0 respectively.
Note that if κ > 0, and if the decision maker correctly anticipates her temptations to be random, then her ex post choice should be random. This prediction of DLR's model differs from mine. Therefore, one can distinguish the two models if ex post choice is observed together with ex ante preferences over menus.
On the other hand, if κ < 0, then cumulative temptation and perfectionism have the same behavioral implications both ex ante and ex post. However, it seems more natural to attribute the second negative component in representation (3) to negative self-evaluation rather than to postulate that long-term normative values can be tempting. (Apparently, this is not a problem for MGM Grand Casino, which has an advertising slogan: "Resist the temptation to resist temptations.")
Besides the more specific ex ante utility representation and the difference in the ex post choice behavior, my model has some other distinctions from DLR's. In particular, I dispense with two technical assumptions (Finiteness, Approximate Improvements are Chosen) that are necessary for DLR's proofs. Instead, my construction of the utility representation (2) relies on the classification of finite subjective state spaces in Kopylov [27] .
Self-evaluative emotions appear in various economic models. In particular, guilt has been used to explain cooperation in firms and families (Casson [7] , Kandel and Lazear [26] , Becker [5] ), and other contexts (Frank [17] ). All of these authors impose guilt as an ad hoc component of agents' utility functions.
Sarver [38] and Dillenberger and Sadowski [12] use versions of GP's choicetheoretic framework to model regret and shame respectively. I relate these models to mine in Section 3.3.
Model
Let X = {x, y, z, . . . } be the set ∆(Z) of all Borel probability measures on a compact metric space Z of deterministic consumptions. Endow X with the weak convergence topology. This topology is metrizable.
Let M be the set of all menus-non-empty compact subsets A ⊂ X. Suppose that choices are made in two stages, ex ante and ex post. Interpret any menu A ∈ M as a course of action that, if taken ex ante, makes the set A ⊂ X feasible ex post.
Endow M with the Hausdorff metric topology. For any menus A, B ∈ M and α ∈ [0, 1], define a mixture
Let ≽ be the decision maker's ex ante preference over M. Following GP and DLR, adapt the well-known conditions of the expected utility theory for the preference ≽.
Axiom 1 (Order). ≽ is complete and transitive.

Axiom 2 (Continuity).
For all A ∈ M, the sets {B ∈ M : B ≽ A} and {B ∈ M : B ≼ A} are closed.
Axiom 3 (Independence). For all α ∈ [0, 1] and menus A, B, C ∈ M,
Order and Continuity are standard. To motivate Independence, interpret any element αx + (1 − α)y in the menu αA + (1 − α)C as a lottery that delivers consumptions x ∈ A and y ∈ C with probabilities α and 1 − α respectively and is resolved after the ex post stage. If the time when this objective uncertainty is resolved is irrelevant for the decision maker's preferences, then she should be indifferent between the menu αA + (1 − α)C and a hypothetical lottery α • A + (1−α)•C that yields the menus A or C with probabilities α and 1−α respectively, but is resolved before the ex post stage. (Here the preference ≽ is extended to lotteries over menus.) The standard separability argument suggests that
because the possibility of getting the menu C with probability 1 − α should not affect the decision maker's comparison of A and B. Independence follows.
Psychological evidence (e.g. Ainslie [1] and Loewenstein [29] ) shows that people act less impulsively as their rewards become more distant temporally or spatially. It is therefore plausible that the ex ante commitment ranking {z} ≽ {y} should reveal the decision maker's long-term normative preference for z over y.
Given any menu A ∈ M and any element z ∈ A, say that z is perfect in A if {z} ≽ {y} for all y ∈ A. For any z ∈ X, let
Then the perfectionist decision maker can strive to choose z in any A ∈ M z and suffer from a negative self-evaluation if she fails to do so.
As illustrated by examples in the introduction, this kind of perfectionism can motivate violations of GP's Set-Betweenness. Consider the following weaker version of this axiom.
Axiom 4 (Perfectionist Set-Betweenness). For all z
To motivate this condition (PSB for short), take any menus A, B ∈ M z that share the same perfect element z. The ranking {z} ≽ A is intuitive because the singleton menu {z} allows the decision maker to fulfil her long-term objectives without any need for ex post self-control. Note that the ranking {z} ≽ A follows from GP's axioms.
5 It is also imposed as a separate axiom (Desire for Commitment) by DLR [10] and by Sarver [38] .
Assume that the decision maker expects ex ante that if her ex post menu is A (or B), then she will choose x A ∈ A (or respectively, x B ∈ B), but her strongest temptation will be y A ∈ A (or respectively y B ∈ B). Then it is intuitive that
Indeed, if x B ∈ A and y A ∈ B, and the decision maker chooses the same consumption x B in the menu A that she plans to choose in B, then
• it should be less costly for her to resist the strongest temptation y A in A than the strongest temptation y B in B because B contains y A as well,
• perfectionist effects should be the same for both menus A and B because these menus share the same perfect alternative.
Therefore, if x B ∈ A and y A ∈ B, then the ranking A ≽ B is intuitive because the former menu allows to choose the same consumption as in B with a better balance of emotional costs and benefits. Condition (4) implies PSB. To show this claim,
Note that PSB can be problematic for more general types of self-control and perfectionism. For instance, PSB is violated in DLR's model of temptation-driven preferences, where the mental costs of self-control are cumulative or uncertain and hence, depend on several temptations in the feasible menu A. Similarly, PSB is problematic if perfectionism is driven by several distinct normative principles that cannot be captured by the sole commitment ranking.
Say that a function
Let U be the set of all continuous linear functions u : X → R.
The following is my main representation result.
Theorem 2.1. ≽ satisfies Axioms 1-4 if and only if ≽ can be represented by
for some κ > −1 and u, v ∈ U .
Note that the commitment utility u represents the preference ≽ over singleton menus because 1 + κ > 0, and U ({x}) = (1 + κ)u(x) for all x ∈ X. More broadly, the interpretation of representation (5) depends on the sign of the parameter κ.
First, if κ = 0, then
has GP's form. Here the function v can be interpreted as temptation utility, and the negative component max y∈A (v(y) − v(x)) as a mental cost of self-control that the decision maker expects to incur in order to choose x and resist the most tempting alternative in the menu A. Second, if κ > 0, then the functional form (5) portrays a decision maker who has ex ante perfectionist strivings. In this case the utility (5) differs from the benchmark case (6) by the non-negative component κ max z∈A u(z). This component can reflect a mental benefit of pursuing, but not necessarily achieving, the long-term objectives represented by the function u. This benefit is proportional to the maximal normative utility that is feasible in A. (In the presence of uncertainty about future temptations, representation (5) with κ > 0 allows other interpretations, which I discuss later.)
Third, if −1 < κ < 0, then the functional form (5) portrays a decision maker who has self-evaluative concerns about her ex post choices. Psychological literature (e.g. Stoeber et al. [40] , Fedewa et al. [13] ) provides plenty of evidence that perfectionist self-evaluation can produce guilt, shame, embarrassment, and other negative emotions. To capture this effect, rewrite the utility function (5) with κ ∈ (−1, 0) as
. (7) The decision maker as portrayed by (7) expects that both self-control and selfevaluation will be mentally costly ex post. The two anticipated costs are proportional to the losses in temptation and commitment utilities that result from the ex post choice in the menu A.
Sketch of Proof
The necessity of the axioms in Theorem 2.1 is straightforward. Turn to sufficiency. Suppose that ≽ satisfies Axioms 1-4. Construct the utility representation (5) as follows. First, show that PSB implies another weak form of Set-Betweenness: for all three menus A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ∈ M,
Use PSB again to show that, without loss in generality, the utility function U has the form
All formal proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Uniqueness and Interpretation of κ
Uniqueness of the components of representation (5) is guaranteed by a mild regularity constraint on the preference ≽.
These rankings are intuitive if the consumption x is normatively better, but less tempting than y, and x ′ is both normatively better and more tempting than y ′ . Say that ≽ is represented by a triple (u, v, κ) if ≽ has the utility representation (5) To interpret the magnitude of the parameter κ, adapt Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini's [9] comparative notions of a greater desire for flexibility and commitment. Consider a pair of preferences ≽ and ≽ * . Say that
To motivate these conditions in my model, let ≽ and ≽ * be represented by triples (u, v, κ) and (u, v, κ
By definition ≽ is more striving and less self-evaluative than ≽ * . It turns out that each of these conditions is also sufficient for the inequality κ ≥ κ * in the regular case. Note that the inequality κ ≥ κ * has three special cases in my model.
• κ ≥ κ * ≥ 0. Then both ≽ and ≽ * reveal ex ante perfectionist strivings, which are more intense for ≽ than for ≽ * .
• κ ≥ 0 ≥ κ * . Then ≽ reveals ex ante perfectionist strivings, but ≽ * reveals ex post self-evaluative concerns. Moreover, ≽ * reveals greater self-control costs than ≽.
• 0 ≥ κ ≥ κ * . Then both ≽ and ≽ * reveal ex post self-evaluative concerns, which are more intense for ≽ * than for ≽. Moreover, ≽ * reveals greater self-control costs than ≽.
Therefore, conditions (8) and (9) have sharper interpretations in my model than in the general theory of subjective state spaces due to DLR [9] . Their Theorem 2 asserts only that (8) and (9) are sufficient for ≽ to have an additive utility representation with a larger set of positive components (or respectively, a smaller set of negative components) than ≽ * .
Ex Post Choice
The decision maker as portrayed by representation (5) should plan her ex post choice x A in any menu A to strike an optimal compromise between her commitment utility, the cost of self-control, and perfectionism. Consider two possible cases.
(i) κ ≥ 0. Then x A should maximize the function
Here perfectionist strivings occur ex ante and hence, should not affect ex post choices.
(ii) −1 < κ < 0. Then x A should maximize
This function reflects the ex post costs of both self-control and self-evaluation.
Thus the anticipated choice x A should maximize the function u + v in each of the above two cases. It should be emphasized though that actual ex post choices need not be determined by the ex ante preference ≽ or a fortiori, by any utility representation that is derived for this preference.
To model ex post choice, consider an additional primitive. For any menu A ∈ M, let C(A) ⊂ A be the non-empty set of all alternatives in A that the decision maker is willing to choose at the ex post stage. Consider two well-known conditions for the choice rule C(·). y ∈ A, y ∈ C(B), and x ∈ B, then x ∈ C(B) .
Axiom 5 (Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference). For all A, B ∈ M and x, y
Arrow [4] shows that this condition (WARP for short) is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a complete and transitive ex post preference ≽ 1 that rationalizes the choice rule C(·). Arrow's result applies here because the space M contains all finite menus.
As X is compact and Hausdorff, then Closed Graph is equivalent to the upper hemicontinuity of C(·) (see Aliprantis and Border [2, Theorem 16.12].)
Axiom 7 (Consistency). For all z ∈ X and A ∈ M,
This condition requires that the decision maker may be unwilling to remove an element z from a menu A only if she plans to choose z in A, or if z is her perfect choice in this menu. 6 In the latter case, she can strive for perfection that she does not expect to achieve ex post. 
This result establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for the ex post choice rule C(·) to comply with the above interpretations of the ex ante utility (5) . Note that neither the parameter κ, nor the functions u and v can be derived from ex post consumption choices. To determine the triple (u, v, κ), one needs to observe the ex ante preference ≽ over menus.
Discussion
Perfectionism and Uncertain Temptations
My model is a special case of a broad class of temptation-driven preferences studied by DLR [10] . However, their interpretation of the utility representations (5) different from mine. First, DLR interpret both negative components in (7) as cumulative costs of self-control, and the functions v and u as two distinct temptation utilities. Yet it appears counterintuitive that the decision maker should be "tempted" to maximize the commitment utility u because temptations should be distinct from normative preferences. Therefore, it seems more natural to attribute the negative component
Second, DLR interpret representation (5) with positive κ > 0 in terms of random temptation. Indeed, if κ > 0, then (5) can be rewritten as
where π = 1 1+κ ∈ (0, 1]. The decision maker as portrayed by this representation believes that with probability π, she will incur the cost of self-control max y∈A (v(y) − v(x)) in order to resist ex post temptations, but with probability 1 − π, she will maximize her normative utility u without being tempted ex post. For example, she may perceive her ex post temptation for an addictive substance to be contingent on the uncertain event that she encounters a cue that triggers her craving for this substance. (Such cue-triggered temptations are studied by Bernheim and Rangel [6] .) Representation (12) is also a special case of Stovall's [43] multiple temptation model, which suggests the same probabilistic interpretation.
Even though perfectionist strivings and random temptation have equivalent utility representations, their implications for ex post choice behavior are different. Random temptation suggests that at the ex post stage, the decision maker should maximize u + v if the temptation strikes and maximize u otherwise. This random choice violates both WARP and Consistency.
In applications, it may be convenient to combine the two models by taking A ≽ B if and only if
where π ∈ (0, 1) and λ ≥ 0. This representation is equivalent to (5) with κ = 1−π+λ π . The decision maker as portrayed by (13) strives ex ante to maximize her commitment utility ex post and believes that with a positive probability she will be able to do so. This interpretation can be psychologically more appealing than the deterministic one, where the decision maker can strive for perfection ex ante without any hope of achieving it ex post.
Representation (5) with κ > 0 can be also viewed as a special case of the random indulgence model due to Dekel and Lipman [8] . Their Theorem 1 implies 
This functional form portrays an agent who has random indulgence ex post and strives for normative perfection ex ante. In this interpretation, her ex post choice belongs to A(v + γu) where γ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
Positive vs Negative Perfectionism
The sign of the parameter κ in representation (5) can be interpreted by the distinction between positive (healthy, normal) and negative (unhealthy, neurotic) perfectionism. The distinction between positive and negative forms of perfectionism has many different labels in the literature-normal vs neurotic perfectionism in Hamachek [20] , positive striving vs maladaptive perfectionism in Frost et al. [18] , positive vs negative perfectionism in Terry-Short et al. [46] , adaptive vs maladaptive perfectionism in Rice et al. [36] , healthy vs unhealthy perfectionism in Stumpf and Parker [45] , functional vs dysfunctional perfectionism in Rheaume et al. [35] , conscientious vs self-evaluative perfectionism in Hill et al. [25] . Psychological literature provides also some empirical evidence for this distinction. For example, Parker [33] identifies clusters of healthy perfectionists (42%), unhealthy perfectionists (25%), and non-perfectionists (33%) in a pool of academically gifted youths. A similar tripartite typology has been found in other samples of gifted adolescents (Schuler [39] ), college students (Rice and Dellwo [37] , Stoeber et al. [40] ) and athletes (Stoeber et al. [42] ). Yet the observed difference between perfectionist groups is relative rather than absolute: the positive group is not completely immune to negative self-evaluative emotions, while the neurotic group can have high scores on all facets of perfectionism, including "striving for excellence".
Therefore, it seems plausible that agents in the two-period menu framework can strive for normative perfection ex ante, but also suffer from a negative selfevaluation if they fail to make the perfect choice ex post. To model this combination of emotions, one can rewrite representation (5) as follows. Fix any κ 0 , κ 1 
. For all A, B ∈ M, assume without loss of generality that max z∈A u(z) ≥ max z∈B u(z), and let
where
Here the component κ 0 (max z∈A u(z) − max z∈B u(z)) can be interpreted as the decision maker's ex ante benefit of striving for perfection and choosing the menu A over B, while κ 1 max z∈A (u(z) − u(x)) can reflect her ex post mental cost of selfevaluation of her choice in the menu A. The parameters κ 0 , κ 1 are not determined uniquely in my model. Note that the functional form (15)- (16) is equivalent to (5) and hence, satisfies Axioms 1-4. In particular, PSB is still intuitive because it does not require that perfectionism must be purely positive or purely negative. Instead, PSB assumes only that perfectionism should have the same effect when the same choice is made in two menus A and B that share the same perfect element.
Perfectionism vs Regret and Shame
My model of perfectionism is related to Sarver's [38] model of regret and Dillenberger and Sadowski's [12] model of shame. These models also use a menu framework to identify negative emotional costs that are imposed by the decision maker's ex post choices.
A simple case of Sarver's representation is
where K ≥ 0 and u, v ∈ U . The decision maker as portrayed by (17) learns whether her true consumption utility is u or v after making her ex post choice x A in a menu A and feels regret if x A does not maximize this utility. Then the two negative components in representation (17) can be interpreted as two expected costs of regret. (Alternatively, one can still interpret these components as cumulative costs of self-control.) Despite some similarities in the interpretation of the functional form, my model has an almost empty overlap with Sarver's. Indeed, if ≽ is a regular preference that has a representation (5), then the rankings {z} ≻ {x} and {x, y, z} ≻ {y, z} must hold for some x, y, z ∈ X. 7 These rankings violate Sarver's Dominance axiom, which requires that if {z} ≽ {x} and z ∈ A, then A ≽ A ∪ {x}. Thus the intersection of the two models contains only irregular preferences, for which v = αu for some α ∈ R. Dillenberger and Sadowski [12] model shame for preferences over menus of monetary divisions (a 1 , a 2 ) between two agents, a dictator and a recipient. An important distinction of their framework is that the dictator's ex post choices in the menu are observed by the recipients, while the ex ante choice of a menu is not. Their model attempts to accommodate the dictator's desire to avoid shame of publicly choosing an unfair division in a menu. A simple version of Dillenberger and Sadowski's representation is
where the function ϕ measures fairness of possible divisions. This function is not assumed to be linear, so that (5, 5) can viewed as more fair than (3, 7) and (7, 3) . This non-linearity, as well as the absence of randomization, requires a more complex axiomatic approach. Besides the primitives and utility representation, Dillenberger and Sadowski's model differs from mine in its focus on the social rather than personal evaluation of one's acts. Moreover, the socially prescribed behavior differs from the ex ante private commitment ranking, and the negative evaluation of one's deviations from social prescriptions is associated with shame rather with other self-evaluative emotions.
This distinction corresponds roughly to Flett and Hewitt's [15] classification of self-oriented perfectionism (SOP) that is based on pursuing self-imposed standards of behavior and 'unrealistic self-expectations in the face of failure' and socially prescribed perfectionism (SPP) that reflects 'a strong concern over obtaining and maintaining the approval and care of other people and a sense of belonging that could be attained if it were possible to be perfect in the eyes of others.'
An Example: Overpaying for Health Clubs
To illustrate my model, consider two health-club contracts A and B that are similar to those in DVM's dataset. The contract A has a flat monthly fee of $70 with unlimited access, and the contract B is a ten-visit pass that costs $100. Suppose that the commitment and temptation utilities are
where t is the number of visits per month, and m is the average monthly monetary expense. This specification uses two simplifying assumptions. First, the normative utility u is quasi-linear and has a quadratic form with respect to the amount of exercise. Second, the temptation utility v is invariant of money and linear with respect to exercise: the agent is assumed to incur a fifty-dollar self-control cost for each session. Note that the immediate marginal price of each session (up to ten) is zero for both contracts A and B. Hence, it seems plausible that spontaneous temptations should be driven exclusively by the reluctance to exercise rather than by monetary concerns. Let the person have utility (2). Then
The normatively best choice in this menu is z A = 15, but the anticipated choice that maximizes u + v is t A = 5. (The average monthly attendance in DVM's data is 4.3.) On the other hand,
Here the normatively best choice of exercise is z B = 13, but the anticipated choice that maximizes u + v is t B = 3. If κ > 3 7 , then the contract A is strictly preferred to B even though the cost of the monthly membership ($70) exceeds the pay-per-visit price ($50) of the five work outs that the decision maker expects to make under the contract A. In this way, perfectionist strivings can explain the overpaying for monthly contracts that is observed by DVM. Note that the anticipated choice t A = 5 in the menu A is normatively better than the anticipated choice t B = 3 because
Suppose next that the self-control cost of a trip to the gym increases to $80 so that v(t) = −80t. Let D be the default menu that does not require any contract and commits the decision maker to zero work outs. Then her optimal choice in both menus A and D is t A = t D = 0. Yet she can still prefer A to D if her perfectionist strivings are sufficiently high: for κ > 28 197 ≈ 0.14,
In this case, the decision maker chooses to pay for her monthly contract even when she does not attend the gym. Therefore, perfectionist strivings can explain why some people may keep their gym membership for a long while after they stop going there. This behavior is also observed by DVM, but violates GP's model.
A APPENDIX: PROOFS
The proofs of Theorems 2.1-2.4 require some preliminaries.
Given any u ∈ U and A ∈ M, write
Then representation (5) can be written as
Given any function u ∈ U , let
be the set of all non-negative transformations of u. By Herstein-Milnor's [24] Theorem, v ∈ T (u) if and only if u and v represent the same ranking on X, or v is constant.
It follows that v ̸ ∈ T (u) if and only if v(y) > v(x) and u(x) ≥ u(y)
for some x, y ∈ X. The following result extends this observation to any number of functions.
Lemma A.1. Let S be a finite index set, and let
, and
Proof.
) for all k, l ∈ S, and hence,
and hence,
Say that u 1 , . . . , u n are redundant if u i ∈ T (u j ) for some i ̸ = j.
Lemma A.2. Suppose that ≽ is represented by a triple (u, v, κ). Then the following statements are equivalent. (i) ≽ is regular.
(ii) if αu + βv + γ = 0 for α, β, γ ∈ R, then α = β = γ = 0.
(iii) u, v, and u + v are not redundant.
(iv) u, −u, and v are not redundant. (1)
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii). Suppose that ≽ is regular and αu
Thus {x, y} ≽ {x} for all x, y ∈ X, which contradicts regularity. 
Proofs of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2
Suppose that ≽ is represented by a triple (u, v, κ) . Order, Continuity, and Independence are straightforward. Show that ≽ satisfies PSB. Take any z ∈ X and
When restricted to the menus A, B, A ∪ B, the preference ≽ is represented by
Turn to sufficiency. Suppose that ≽ satisfies Axioms 1-4. Show that ≽ can be represented by (19) .
Take any three menus For concreteness, let z ∈ A 1 and A 1 ∪ A 3 ≽ A 1 ∪ A 2 . These conditions can be always satisfied by renumbering A i 's. By PSB,
Thus an arbitrary triple A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ∈ M has at most two positive and at most two negative menus as defined by Kopylov [27] . His Theorem 2.1 implies that ≽ can be represented by
for some u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 ∈ U . Fix any x * ∈ X. Let all the functions u i satisfy
Take any j ̸ = i such that u i ̸ = 0 and u i ∈ T (u j ). By (22) , u i = αu j for some α > 0. Let λ 1 = λ 2 = 1 and λ 3 = λ 4 = −1. If α ≤ 1, then u i and u j in (21) can be replaced by 0 and (1 + αλ i /λ j )u j respectively. If α > 1, then u i and u j in (21) can be replaced by (α + λ j /λ i )u j and 0 respectively. Thus it is without loss in generality to assume that for all i ̸ = j,
Let
The function u 0 ∈ U represents the preference ≽ restricted to singleton menus. Take x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ∈ X that satisfy the conditions of Lemma A.1. Suppose that u 1 ̸ ∈ T (u 0 ) and u 2 ̸ ∈ T (u 0 ). Let B 1 = {x 0 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 } and B 2 = {x 0 , x 1 , x 3 , x 4 }. As u 1 ̸ = 0 and u 2 ̸ = 0, then u 1 ̸ ∈ T (u j ) for all j ̸ = 1 and u 2 ̸ ∈ T (u j ) for all j ̸ = 2. By (20) ,
, and u j (B 1 ) = u j (B 2 ) = u j (x j ) for j = 0, 3, 4. Representation (21) implies that B 1 ∪ B 2 ≻ B 1 and B 1 ∪ B 2 ≻ B 2 , which contradicts PSB because B 1 and B 2 share the same perfect element x 0 . Thus u 1 ∈ T (u 0 ) or u 2 ∈ T (u 0 ). For concreteness, assume that u 2 ∈ T (u 0 ). By (22) , u 2 = α 2 u 0 for some α 2 ≥ 0.
Suppose next that u 3 ̸ ∈ T (u 0 ) and
Analogously to the previous case, representation (21) implies that B 1 ≻ B 1 ∪ B 2 and B 2 ≻ B 1 ∪ B 2 , which contradicts PSB as well. Thus u 3 ∈ T (u 0 ) or u 4 ∈ T (u 0 ). For concreteness, assume that u 4 ∈ T (u 0 ). By (22) , u 4 = α 4 u 0 for some α 4 ≥ 0.
Thus representation (21) can be written as
where γ = α 2 − α 4 ∈ R and u 1 − u 3 + γu 0 = u 0 . Consider two cases.
Case 1. The functions u 0 , u 1 , u 3 are not redundant. Consider several subcases.
However, the ranking {x 0 , x 1 , x 3 } ≻ {x 0 } contradicts PSB because x 0 is the perfect element in the menu {x 0 , x 1 , x 3 }.
(ii) γ = 1. Then u 1 − u 3 = 0. By (23) , u 1 = u 3 = 0. Then U is constant, which is impossible.
(iii) γ < 1. Then U has the form (19) 
Case 2. The functions u 0 , u 1 , u 3 are redundant. Then (23) and u 1 − u 3 + γu 0 = u 0 imply that u 1 = α 1 u 0 and u 3 = α 3 u 0 for some α 1 , α 3 ∈ R (not necessarily positive). Then representation (24) can be written as
where u − = −u 0 and β ∈ R. Consider several subcases.
(i) β > 1. Take any x, y ∈ X such that u 0 (x) > u 0 (y). Then {x, y} ≻ {x} ≻ {y}, which contradicts PSB. Thus u 0 is constant. By (22) , u 0 = 0, u 1 = u 3 and hence, U = 0 has the form (19) for u = v = 0. Here ≽ is not regular.
(ii) β = 1. Then U has the form (19) for u = u 0 , v = 0, and κ = 0. Here the ranking {x} ≻ {x, y} is impossible, and the preference ≽ is not regular.
(iii) β < 1. Then U has the form (19) 
Proof of Theorem 2.3
Suppose that ≽ and ≽ * are regular preferences that share the same commitment rankings and satisfy Axioms 1-4. By Theorem 2.1, these preferences can be represented by some triples (u, v, κ) and (u * , v * , κ * ). Without loss in generality, u = u * because u and u * represent the same ranking on X. 
On the other hand,
(ii) u + v and u + v * are not redundant. Then
Thus A ∪ B ≻ * A and A ≻ A ∪ B. Then u 1 (z) > u 1 (y) for all y ∈ B such that y ̸ = z. Yet u 0 (z) < u 0 (αx 0 + (1 − α)x * ) and u 2 (z) < u 2 (αx 2 + (1 − α)x * ). Then B ̸ ∈ M z and by (19) , B ≻ B \ {z}. By Consistency, C(B) = {z}. As α can be arbitrarily small, then by Closed Graph, x * ∈ C(A).
Take any y ∈ A such that u 1 (y) < u 1 (x * ). Let Y = {x ∈ X : u 1 (y) < u 1 (x) < u 1 (x * )}. Then Y is a mixture space. When restricted to Y , the linear functions u 0 , u 1 , u 2 are not redundant. Therefore, x 0 , x 1 , x 2 can be found in Y . Let B = {x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , y}. By (19) 
